Reported SSH Backdoor in Claude Code Extension Served Through Cursor
Phorion, an endpoint detection and response (EDR) firm, is reporting Official Claude Code Extension Compromise: Security Advisory in an announcement authored by Calum Hall.
There is an active discussion on Kevin Beaumont’s @GossiTheDog Mastodon account as well as in the comments of the related Hacker News discussion, Backdoor in Claude Code for VS Code extension on the Cursor Marketplace.
According to Phorion, a tampered build of the Claude Code extension for Visual Studio Code was served through the Cursor marketplace. The compromised version was 2.1.313, and Cursor has since pulled it. Per comments on Hacker News from someone identifying as an Anthropic employee, this was not a compromise of Anthropic’s own systems. The statement said that someone with access to Cursor’s marketplace published a tampered copy that Anthropic did not build or publish, and that only Cursor users are affected.
Update, October 30, 2026 at 11 AM EST: A significant clarification, since a major fear was that the official Visual Studio Code extension was also hit. In the Hacker News discussion, a commenter identifying as “Dworken” from Anthropic wrote: “This only impacted the extension as it was hosted on the Cursor marketplace. It did not impact the official VS Code extension marketplace or OpenVSX. Users of Claude Code on VS Code are not impacted by this issue.” That is a statement from a commenter, not a published advisory, so I am treating it as credible but still unconfirmed by a post-mortem. The same commenter also stated that version 2.1.313 was never a legitimate release: “2.1.313 was never published on OpenVSX, the VS Code marketplace, or on any of our official hosts. The malicious actor here had published a fake version of this extension on Cursor’s marketplace. In order to disambiguate, we made sure our next update was 2.1.314.” In other words, any copy of 2.1.313 you find is the fake one, and Anthropic skipped that number on purpose so the real releases are unambiguous. The Hacker News thread has also since had duplicate submissions merged into the one linked above.
I have not seen a full post-mortem from either company yet, so treat the details as developing.
To determine if you were impacted, first check whether you are or were recently running 2.1.313 of the extension, particularly if you use Cursor. Reports on the exact timing vary, so to be safe consider the window of exposure to be October 28 through October 30, 2026. If you had the extension installed or updated during that window, you should look for indicators of compromise and plan accordingly:
- a new key in your ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file (Phorion reports the key comment is svc-telemetry), or
- new .smt, .smtk, or smt.cmd files written to your ~/.config/ folder.
There may be additional indicators to consider, see the Phorion writeup for the full list.
On the systems we checked, we have not seen such evidence at this time.
This is a software supply chain attack, where the code you trust arrives through a legitimate distribution channel already tampered with. I covered the same class of problem in RubyGems Open Source Supply Chain Security and OpenAI and, back in 2019, in Ruby Gems Supply Chain Vulnerability.
It is also a good reminder of the importance of practicing good sandboxing procedures when working with a coding agent. These are powerful engines that have access to code and secrets and by their very nature execute remotely supplied code with minimal human review, which is the same habit that makes vibe coding risky.
My immediate recommendation for anyone is to create isolated virtual machines for use by your coding agents and only supplying the files necessary for their specific work. This is putting the principle of least privilege into action.